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I. INTRODUCTION

One of the key ingredients of a successful transition to a market economy is a
strong legal foundation.' The collapse of the Soviet Union brought an opportunity
for nations previously constrained by socialist economic principles to emerge
independently as players in the world economy.2 The former Soviet states began
to reform their legal systems, accounting for each nation's individual economic
circumstances,' custom, 4 and other outside influences that affect them as
independent nations
Some of the former Soviet states have succeeded in making legal reforms
effective in their transition to a successful market economy while others have
not.6 Of the fifteen states that emerged after the breakup of the Soviet Union,
only three have acceded to the European Union ("EU"). Joining the EU is
important for enhancing economic prosperity because it broadens economic
possibilities • such
as trade, employment possibilities, education, and political
7
collaboration.
The first ex-Soviet nation to begin negotiations with the EU was Estonia.!
Estonia was also the first Soviet Republic to take progressive action towards
gaining independence and producing effective economic legislative reforms. 9

1. AVINASH K DIXIT, LAWLESSNESS AND ECONOMICS 2 (Richard Blundell ed., Princeton University
Press 2004).
2. See Kirsten Storin Doty, Economic Legal Reforms as a Necessary Means for Eastern European
Transition into the Twenty-First Century, 33 INT'L LAW. 189, 190 (1999) (proposing that the ability of Eastern
Europe to make successful transition to market economies and democracy will depend upon the new legal
systems put into place).
3. See id. at 195 (stating that legislatures were not free to form laws and policy but were constrained by
history and the economy).
4. See Young Lee & Patrick Meagher, Misgovernanceor Misperception? Law and Finance in Central
Asia, in ASSESSING THE VALUE OF LAW IN TRANSITION ECONOMIES 133, 165 (Peter Murrell ed., University of
Michigan 2001) (noting that observers have suggested that law has the greatest impact on behavior when it
leverages pre-existing social norms and customs).
5. Doty, supra note 2, at 193 (discussing how people's belief in communism can change, resulting in an
immediate acceptance of democracy and a free market economy).
6. See Peter Daniel DiPaola, The Criminal Time Bomb: An Examination of the Effect of the Russian
Mafiya on the Newly Independent States of the Former Soviet Union, 4 IND. J. GLOBAL LEG. STUD. 145, 145
(1996) (describing how the Russian economy has responded slowly to reform and that organized crime
threatens to overwhelm Russian politics, economics and society). But see Christopher Osakwe, Anatomy of the
1994 Civil Codes of Russia and Kazakstan: A Biopsy of the Economic Constitutions of Two Post-Soviet
Republics, 73 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1413, 1414 (1998) (proposing that Russian and Kazak post-Soviet civil
codes will go down in history as superb examples of successful legal transplantations).
7. See Hollin K. Dickerson, Judging the Judges: The State of Judicial Reform in Eastern Europe on the
Eve ofAccession, 32 INT'L J. LEGAL INFO. 539, 546 (2004).
8. Barbi Applequist, The European Union v. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization: Estonia's
Conflicting Interests as a Party to the InternationalCriminal Court, 27 HASTINGS INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 77,
78 (2003).
9. Paul Varul, Legal Policy and Decisions and Choices in the Creation of New PrivateLaw in Estonia,
V JURIDICA INTERNATIONAL 104, 105 n.7 (2000), available at http://www.juridica.ee/international-en.php?
document=en/international/2000/l/22592.SUM.php.
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Estonia's bold economic and legal reforms have paid off, according to recent
studies conducted by The World Bank and The Wall Street Journal. The recent
World Bank study, Doing Business in 2006,'0 ranked Estonia in the top thirty
nations whose laws promote easy business development." The Wall Street
Journal ranked Estonia fourth in the 2005 Index of Economic Freedom.2 These
studies reinforce the possibility that transition economies, such as Estonia, can
successfully reform economic laws and policies to develop a business-friendly
legal system that encourages foreign investment and bolsters an economy.
One of the most important changes in Estonia was the reformation of the
legislation governing contract law. 3 By creating new legislation, based on model
codes and foreign examples, the Law of Obligations Act is a great example of
how to restructure areas of private law that allow business transactions to
function smoothly. The Law of ObligationsAct introduces concepts that are new
to Estonian practitioners, such as freedom of contract, principles of good faith in
contractual relations, new concepts of contractual breach, and the imposition of
damages in the event of a breach.1
In addition to reforming contract law legislation, the enactment of a new
Courts Act introduces regulations that enable the judiciary to effectively enforce
contracts in Estonia.'5 The Courts Act imposes new rules that allow the judiciary
to become accountable,16 more transparent,'7 and less susceptible to corruption"
by introducing new disciplinary measures. '9 Furthermore, the qualifications
required for judicial service have been improved to ensure
that those in a position
20
to apply legal doctrines have proper credentials to do so.

10. See generally WORLD BANK, DOING BUSINESS IN 2006: CREATING JOBS (The International Bank for
Reconstruction and Development/The World Bank 2006).
11. A high ranking does not indicate that businesses should conduct business solely with high-ranking
countries, but rather that the countries have created regulatory environments conducive to business operations.
See id. at 3.
12. The Index is a theoretical analysis of the most influential factors affecting the institutional setting of
economic growth, where the findings suggest that countries with the most economic freedom have higher rates
of long-term economic growth. See MARC A. MILES ET AL., THE HERITAGE FOUNDATION, 2005 INDEX TO
ECONOMIC FREEDOM 1 (The Heritage Foundation/Wall Street Journal 2005).
13. See Irene Kull, European and Estonian Law of Obligations-Transpositionof Law or Mutual
Influence? IX JURIDICA INTERNATIONAL 32, 35 (2004) (explaining that Estonia's task of ensuring uniform

rights for all member states was completed upon adoption of the new Law of Obligations Act), available at
http://www.juridica.ee/intemational-en.php?document=en/intemationaV22O44/in5753.SUM.php.
14. See discussion infra Part Il.b.
15. See discussion infra Part IV.b.
16.

OPEN SOCIETY INSTITUTE, MONITORING EU ACCESSION PROCESS: JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE IN

ESTONIA 156 (2001) [hereinafter JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE], available at http://www.eumap.orglreports/2001/

judicial/sections/estonia/judicialestonia.pdf.
17. Estonica, Judicial System, General Principles of Judicial Proceedings and the Structure of the
Judicial System, http://www.estonica.org (stating that court sessions are made public) (last visited Mar. 27,
2006).
18. The Estonia Page, Judicial Reform in Estonia, http://www.esis.ee (last visited Mar. 27, 2006)
(explaining that there are multiple guarantees of judicial independence).
19. Kohtute seadus [KS] [Courts Act] art. 88 (Est.).
20. Id. at art. 54(1).
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To accompany legislative change, changes in the legal education have
ensured the success of legal reform.2' As Estonia becomes increasingly integrated
with the rest of Europe, lawyers will have to be prepared to work in a
multinational legal society. 22 The curriculum has been altered to allow for more
courses relating to private law and European law, which will enable lawyers to
adapt to further international integration.23 Additionally, an increase in quality
faculty members has produced a more accomplished body of educators, which
has resulted in an increased publication of legal literature in Estonia.24
This comment highlights the important legislative reforms that have allowed
Estonia to develop successfully as a market economy. 25 Because of careful
comparative study and the harmonization of their laws with those from other
Western legal systems, Estonia has developed a clear and concise law to regulate
contracts, which is the cornerstone of all business relations.26 Additionally, the
judicial system has been completely reformed, which ensures successful
enforcement of business contracts in Estonia. Furthermore, legislative reforms
have been introduced to practicing lawyers in Estonia, by way of substantial
reforms in legal education. Without complementary reform in these three areas,
Estonia would not be recognized among the top nations whose laws promote
business development.
The impact of legislative change, utilizing comparative study, and
consideration of contract laws from other European nations is considerable. By
harmonizing new laws with those of potential trade partners, Estonia has
facilitated business development and encouraged trade.27 Harmonization allows
different nations to align legal concepts that govern mandatory rules, standard
default provisions, and concrete laws to provide an effective mechanism for
enforcement. 2' Legal harmonization leads to lower transaction costs and the
elimination of some uncertainty that occurs when transacting business
transnationally.29
This comment proposes that Estonia should be a model for other transition
economies when looking to increase local business development. Furthermore,
21.
22.
23.

See discussion infra Part IV.
See Varul, supra note 9, at 117.
See Kalle Merusk et al., On Legal Basis and Processof Accreditation of Teaching of Law in Estonia,
I JURIDICA INTERNATIONAL 142, Annex 1 (1998), available at http://www.juridica.ee/intemational-en.php?
document=en/international/1998/l/22563.SUM.php.
24. University of Tartu Faculty of Law, General Information, Development Plan, http://www.iuri
dicum.ee (last visited Mar. 27, 2006).
25. See Jenik Radon, Permitted Unless Prohibited:The Changed Soviet Mentality, 20 FORDHAM INT'L
L.J. 365, 380 (1996) (stating that Estonia and Georgia have provided examples of effective legal reform, that
are possible when reform is given the appropriate consideration); see also WORLD BANK, supra note 10, at 92.
26. See Danielle Mazzini, Stable International Contracts in Emerging Markets: An Endangered
Species?, 15 B.U. INT'L L.J. 343, 344 (1997).
27. See discussion infra Part V.
28. See infra text accompanying notes 244-265.
29. See infra text accompanying notes 249-260.
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Estonia provides an ideal environment for American businesses looking to
expand internationally. Part II highlights certain changes to contract legislation
that have harmonized Estonia with Western contract theory. Part III highlights
changes to the Estonian judicial system that have enabled the enforcement of
contracts between business entities. Part IV describes changes to the quality of
legal education that will allow legal practitioners in Estonia to ensure the success
of legislative reform by implementing new legal method in business transactions.
Part V argues that by harmonizing legislation with the laws of other European
nations, Estonia has created a legal system that can serve as a stepping-stone for
further transition, in the event that the EU eventually unifies contract laws of
member states.

II. REMOVING OBSTACLES TO GROWTH
When Estonia gained independence in 1991, the need to reform legislation
was immediately apparent.3 ° In particular, Soviet contract theory was not
sufficiently adaptable to a market economy structure, and the pre-Soviet Estonian
legislation governing contract law was outdated.3' Soviet contract theory lacked
basic Western contract law principles, such as freedom of contract 32 and
principles mandating good faith among contracting parties. The implementation
of the Law of Obligations introduced principles of freedom of contract and good
faith into Estonian society.33 Both concepts are of utmost importance for business4
contracting in a market economy and for furthering international trade.
Furthermore, by changing concepts of breach,3" and allowing for the possibility
of damages in the event of a breach,36 the Law of Obligations guarantees that
judges can find an appropriate remedy for an aggrieved party. The Law of
Obligations provides an excellent example of how comparative study can
produce a simple, yet still thorough law to govern contracts.
30. Estonia gained independence in August 1991, and work began in 1992 to establish an Estonian Civil
Code. See Paul Varul & Heiki Pisuke, Louisiana's Contribution to the Estonian Civil Code, 73 TUL. L. REV.
1027, 1028 (1999); see also Peter Byrne & Philip G. Schrag, Law Reform in Estonia: The Role of Georgetown
University Law Center, 25 LAW & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 449, 449 (1994) (explaining that, when the team from
Georgetown arrived, they witnessed the economic ruins produced by communism-markets attempting to
flourish without good law).
31. See generally Varul, supra note 9, at 108-14 (explaining that although other Estonian legislation was
modeled after pre-Soviet legislation, the 1940 draft Civil Code from pre-Soviet occupation could not be used as
a model for future legislation because it was outdated).
32. Id. at 104 n.l.
33. See Vala6igusseadus [Law of Obligations Act] art. 6, 16 (Est.).
34. The ability of parties to decide matters are "the cornerstones of an open, market-oriented and
competitive international economic order." The parties' duty to act in good faith "is of such a fundamental

nature that the parties may not contractually exclude or limit it." See

INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTE FOR THE

UNIFICATION OF PRIVATE LAW, UNIDROIT PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL CONTRACTS art.

cmt. 1,1.8 cmt. 4 (Unidroit 2004).
35. See V61a6igusseadus [Law of Obligations Act] art.103 (Est.).
36. See id. at art. 220(3).

1.1
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A.

Contractingin Soviet Society
Socialist legal theory. differs significantly from Western perspectives.37 In

former socialist countries, law was used as a political mechanism for achieving
party goals.38 In an effort to overcome unequal distribution of economic
resources, the state is the owner of all property and loans issued to economic
entities for use. 39 Likewise, contracts are governed by regulations, which grant
limited autonomy over the exchange of property without state involvement. 0 As
one scholar describes, "[c]ontract law operated more in the shadow of the law,

instead of being a central part of the law itself as in market economies. ' This is
because contractual interactions were subject to the will of the Communist
party, 42 and personal property was the only area of contract law that parties were
allowed to contract without state involvement. Even the limited autonomy that
was granted to individuals regarding personal property was only granted to
further individual and family use.43 The result was the increased use of black
market transactions to avoid the restrictive nature of state control."
Not only did Soviet contract law differ with regard to the theoretical
differences underlying basic principles of contracting, but also there were
differences with respect to contract formalities. Soviet contract law distinguished

between ordinary contracts and economic contracts.

Economic contracts were

formed on behalf of a Soviet organization to further the planned economic
activity of a government agency, which was essentially the representative of the
people.46 Consequently, any breach of contract was considered a breach on

37.

See Villu Kove, Applicable Law in the Light of Modem Law of Obligations and Bases for the

Preparation of the Law of Obligations Act, VI JURIDICA INTERNATIONAL 30, 34 (2001), available at

(noting that
http://www.juridica.ee/international-en.php?document=en/intemationa1l2001/l/24039.SUM.php
despite continued use of the old code after gaining independence, it would be inconceivable to continue to use
the old code for future legislation because it was created based upon a different ideology concerning the
relationships between contracting parties).

38. See Doty, supra note 2, at 194.
39. See Norbert Reich, Transformation of Contract Law and Civil Justice in the New EU Member
Countries-The Example of the Baltic States, Hungary and Poland,23 PENN ST. INT'L L. REV. 587, 592 (2005);
see also Kove, supra note 37, at 30 (explaining that the main distinction between Soviet civil codes and other
European civil codes was the lack of regulatory codes regarding real property).
40. Reich, supra note 39, at 592.
41. Id. at 593.
42.

See id. at 592-93; see also F.J.M. FELDBRUGGE ET AL, ENCYCLOPEDIA OF SOVIET LAW 171 (1985)

(stating that freedom of will between contracts among citizens was limited by "principles of communist
morality").
43. Reich, supra note 39, at 592.
44. See Reich, supra note 39, at 593; see also DiPaola, supra note 6, at 170 (providing an example, in
Estonia, of how authorities often permit organized crime to continue because of its economic benefit).
45.

FELDBRUGGE, supra note 42, at 170.

46.

See id. at 171; see also OLIMPIAD S. IOFFE, SOVIET CIVIL LAW 150 (F.J.M. Feldbrugge ed., 1988).
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society and a social obligation because contractual relationships were based on
principles of socialist public ownership. 7
To protect the weaker party, freedom to contract was restricted in favor of a
justice-oriented approach. 48 Restrictions on freedom to contract enabled those
who could not protect their interests to distribute the risk that accompanied
contractual relationships. 49 There were no requirements mandating that
-contracting parties act in good faith. 0 The objective was to promote actual
performance of contractual obligations, and consequently, specific performance
was the favored remedy in the event of a breach.5
Because specific performance was the favored remedy in Soviet civil law,
damages were only awarded in limited circumstances,52 and often times a breach
resulted in a penalty or fine.53 If a debtor were to neglect performing an
obligation under the contract, the creditor had a right to demand performance, but
any negative consequences of the breach, such as damages, were not imposed.'
Furthermore, any liability resulting from breach of contract was determined by
the extent of culpability on behalf of the breaching party.55
B. Law of ObligationsAct
Despite regaining independence from the Soviet Union, the Civil Code of the
Estonian Soviet Socialist Republic ("Estonian SSR") continued to regulate
private law in Estonia until the civil code was complete.56 When Estonia declared
independence, all legislation prepared prior to Soviet occupation was used as the
basis for an entirely new codification of laws.57 This new body of law not only
reflected Estonian traditions, but also reflected current European legal norms and
EU requirements.58 The Law of Obligations Act, which governs contract
Lisa A. Granik, Soviet Contract Law and Perestroika,78 GEO. L.J. 231, 236 (1989).
Irene Kull, Legal Integration and Reforms-Innovations and Traditions, V JURIDICA INTERNATIONAL 119, 122 (2000), availableat http://www.juridica.ee/get-doc.php?id=335.
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. Granik, supra note 47, at 236.
52. Such as providing liquidated damages, if stipulated to, in the contract. See id.
53. Id. at 236-37.
54. This was also true in the case of delayed performance. The creditor was legally allowed to refuse
performance if delayed but negative consequences were not imposed as a result of the breach. See IOFFE, supra
note 46, at 176.
55. See FELDBRUGGE, supra note 57, at 178; see also IOFFE, supra note 46, at 205.
56. The Civil Code consists of five acts, which were enacted in pieces. The Law of Property Act entered
into force in 1993. The General Partof the Civil Code Act entered into force in 1994 followed by The Family
Law Act in 1995. The Law of Succession Act entered into force in 1996 and finally, the Law of ObligationsAct
became effective in 2002. See Varul, supra note 30, at 1028-30; see also Varul, supra note 9, at 110 (explaining
that the reason for passing the Law of PropertyAct first was to ensure that further reforms were successful).
57. See Priidu Parna, Legal Reform in Estonia, 33 INT'L J. LEGAL INFO. 219,223 (2005).
58. See id. (explaining that new legislation was written to harmonize 80,000 pages of European
legislation, thereby creating a simple legal system that was easily understood by foreigners).
47.
48.
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formation in Estonia, became effective on July 1, 2002. s9 Models of other civil
codes were used in the creation of the Estonian civil code, namely the German
civil code, the Swiss civil code, the Austrian civil code, and the Baltic Code of
Private Law, which was used prior to Soviet occupation.60 Guided by the
Principles of European Contract Law ("PECL") and the Principles of
International Commercial Contracts ("UNIDROIT"), 6' Estonia included basic
transactional rules in its civil code.62 Contract law directives of the EU were
incorporated, 63 and drafts of the Law of ObligationsAct were approached with the
theory that the unification of European contract laws was necessary to develop a
single European market.64
New concepts of contract theory were added to the legal culture of Estonia
by the adoption of the Law of Obligations Act.6 For example, parties are now
allowed the freedom to contract, guaranteeing parties autonomy in contract
formation.66 A new mandatory provision requiring parties to contract in good
faith will ensure that parties enter into business relations for proper purposes and
negotiate without malicious intentions.67 Since the binding force of contracts has
now become a reality, parties will not neglect obligations due to inconvenience.6
Finally, the introduction of negative consequences, in the form of damages, will
69
ensure that contracts are taken seriously by all parties.
1. Freedom of Contract
One of the most important principles of private law is to allow parties the
freedom to contract.70 Contrary to principles of Soviet civil law, where freedom
to contract was not recognized,7' the Law of ObligationsAct allows contracts to

59. Kull, supranote 13, at 33.
60. Varul, supra note 9, at 108 (stating that models were also used from the civil codes of Denmark,
France, Italy, Louisiana, Quebec, and the Nordic countries).
61.

UNIDROIT, supra note 34.

62. This is different from the German Law of Obligations, which regulates trade transactions in a
separate code. See Varul, supra note 9, at 110.
63. See id. at 107; see also Kove, supra note 37, at 36 (summarizing the EU directives that were
incorporated into the draft Law of ObligationsAct).
64. Irene Kull, Legal Remedies Provided in the Estonia Draft Law of Obligations Act for Breach of
Contractual Obligations, IV JURIDICA INTERNATIONAL 147, 147 (1999), available at http://www.juridica.ee/
intemational-en.php?document=en/international/1999/1/24310.SLJM.php.
65. See infra text accompanying notes 70-120.
66. V6laoigusseadus [Law of Obligations Act] art.5-6, 16 (Est.).
67. See id. at art.6; see also Kull, supra note 13, at 38.
68. V6la6igusseadus [Law of Obligations Act] art.8(2) (Est.).
69. id. at art.101.
70. See id. at art.5; see also Kull, supra note 13, at 36 (explaining that the parties may derogate from the
act, unless precluded by another section)
71. Varul, supra note 9, at 104 n.1; Ole Lando, CISG and Its Followers: A Proposal to Adopt Some
InternationalPrinciplesof Contract Law, 53 AM. J. COMP. L. 379, 387 (2005) (explaining that the wording of

Global Business & Development Law Journal/ Vol. 19
be entered into freely, so long as the conditions of the contract are clear and
decisions are made freely. Estonian courts have maintained allowing parties the
freedom to contract73
14 and have interfered only when the substantive fairness of a
contract is at stake. Moreover, contractual autonomy is encouraged, unless there
are disproportionate obligations weighed against one of the parties.75 Before
finding a contract voidable by one of the parties, courts will review all the
circumstances surrounding the transactions." The freedom to contract will be
restricted only if consent has been tainted by fraud, coercion, or unequal
bargaining power." Additionally, with the exception for contracts involving real
property,78 formal requirements are only imposed when necessary for the
protection of one of the parties.79 By allowing parties the freedom to contract,
Estonia has codified "the cornerstones of an open, market-oriented, and
competitive international economic order." 80
2. Good Faith
Perhaps one of the most important additions to Estonian private law is the
introduction of the general principle of good faith.8 ' Prior to the enactment of the
Law of Obligations Act, there were no provisions requiring the parties to act in
good faith when entering into contractual obligations 2 The General Part of the
Civil Code Act, enacted in 1994, provides for an obligation to exercise good faith
regarding basic civil rights. 83 The Law of ObligationsAct sets forth an additional

many model codes allowing freedom to contract is contrary to principles of socialist economies where the
government controls terms of a contract).
72. Vbla6igusseadus [Law of Obligations Act] arts. 5-6, 16 (Est.).
73. Kull, supra note 13, at 36 (citing supreme court decision CCSCd 3-2-1-80-02.-RT III 2002, 27, 302)
(concluding that contracts are voidable by the parties under extremely unfavorable conditions where one party
has taken advantage of certain conditions to the detriment of the other party).
74. Id. at 36-37 (citing supreme court decision CCSCd 3-2-1-29-02-RT III 2002, 14, 164, where the
court held that contracts that subject one party to full control-such as one where the management of a
company was aware of upcoming bankruptcy and nonetheless bound one party to a ninety-nine year lease
without a right of reviewing rental terms-are substantively unfair).
75. See id. at 36 (explaining that the supreme court has not found a contract void because of excessive
interest rates alone).
76. See id. (circumstances such as experience, a forced situation, lack of power and other circumstances
will be taken into consideration).
77. See Lando, supra note 71, at 388.
78. Referred to as an "immovable." See Vd1aoigusseadus [Law of Obligations Act] art. 175(6) (Est.).
79. See id. at arts. 807, 144(2); see also Kull, supra note 13, at 37 (citing formal requirements for the
declaration of intention by a consumer before or during entry into a contract).
80. UNIDROIT, supra note 34, at art 1.1cmt. 1.
81. Vla~igusseadus [Law of Obligations Act] art. 6 (Est.).
82. Kull, supra note 48, at 122.
83. Id. (explaining that principles of good faith have only been cited by Estonian courts since 1998
because it is a relatively new concept).

539
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requirement of good faith by requiring parties to adhere to principles of good
faith during contractual negotiations.
Although the German civil code was used as an example for most of the
Estonian civil code, the Law of Obligations Act broadens the scope of the German
good faith application." The general clause requiring good faith on behalf of
contracting parties is modeled after German law.86 The second part of the good faith
requirement expands on the German definition with the addition of the following:
"nothing arising from law, usage or transaction may be applied if it is contrary to
good faith. 8 7 Because the principle of good faith is a relatively new concept in
Estonian legal practice, the courts have applied this concept in limited
circumstances." 8

The introduction of good faith is also important for governing the rights and
obligations of parties during precontractual negotiations, which were never before
regulated. 89 Because there was no legal basis for enforcing precontractual promises,
such as good faith, courts could not enforce such promises prior to the enactment of
the Law of Obligations Act.9° Furthermore, the establishment of a disclosure
requirement has provided Estonia with a legal basis for allowing parties to claim
damages for circumstances that arise out of precontractual negotiations.9'
By mandating parties to act in accordance with good faith and fair dealing, the
Law of Obligations Act protects against the abuse of rights by a party.92 This
alleviates damage to a weaker party in the event that one party contracts without the
intention of fulfilling its obligation. 93 Uniformity with regard to good faith is of
utmost importance in the context of international trade because standards of practice
may vary from one environment to another, depending on the legal culture.94

84. See V51a6igusseadus [Law of Obligations Act] art. 6 (Est.); see also Kull, supra note 13, at 38.
85. See V6laSigusseadus [Law of Obligations Act] art. 6(2) (Est.); see also Kull, supra note 13, at 38
(explaining that the wording in the Law of ObligationsAct provides that "nothing arising from law, a usage, or a
transaction shall be applied to an obligation if it is contrary to the principle of good faith").
86. Kull, supra note 13, at 38.
87. This definition of good faith is broader than the German counterpart on good faith. Id.
88. Irene Kull, Principle of Good Faith and Constitutional Values in Contract Law, VII JURIDICA
INTERNATIONAL 142, 148 (2002), available at http://www.juridica.ee/intemational-en.php?document=en/
intemationall2002/l/39981.SUM.php (citing dwelling disputes, labor disputes, and loan contracts as examples
of instances where principles of good faith have been applied by Estonian courts).
89. Id. (proposing that the situation will likely change since negotiations are being regulated, which will
improve the protection of constitutional values in private contractual relationships).
90. See Kull, supra note 48, at 123 (explaining that courts have repeatedly held preliminary agreements
as non-binding in the past, because such agreements were not protected by previous laws).
91. V6la6igusseadus [Law of Obligations Act] art. 14 (Est.).
92. UNIDROIT, supra note 34, at art. 1.8 cmt. 2.
93. Id.
94. Id. at art. 1.8 cmt. 3.
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3.

95

PactaSunct Servunda

The Law of Obligations Act adopts the UNIDROIT principles regarding the
binding force of contracts. 96 Contracts are concluded by offer and acceptance, as
long as there is a mutual declaration of intention that the parties have reached a
sufficient agreement.97 An offer may be withdrawn so long as the withdrawal is
received prior to, or at the same time, as the offer.99
Under the Law of ObligationsAct, any failure to meet contractual obligations
or any nonperformance is considered a breach.' 9 Unlike Soviet law, a breach of
contract may be excusable'0° or inexcusable,'' and damages incurred from a
breach are not necessarily evaluated upon the presence of fault by one party.' °2 In
the case of force majeure,'03 a contract may be automatically terminated without
an expression of will on behalf of the parties.'" Once the contractual obligation is
terminated due to force majeure, the other party is not allowed to claim
damages.'0 5 Additionally, the Law of Obligations Act imposes a notice
requirement on parties claiming exemption from contractual obligations. '° The
aggrieved nonbreaching party must notify the breaching party within a
reasonable time after the discovery of the breach.' 7 The new provisions that are
introduced in the Law of ObligationsAct allow each contract to be assessed on an
individual level and are no longer a breach on an entire society. 0 8 Furthermore, in
situations where superior forces prevent the fulfillment of an obligation, the party
is relieved of consequences that normally occur upon a breach.'0 9

95. This phrase endorses the principle that promises must be kept and is used to emphasize the binding
force of contracts. See B. Sharon Byrd & Joachim Hruschka, Kant on "Why Must I Keep My Promise?", 81
CHI.-KENT L. REV. 47, 72 (2006).
96. V61ahigusseadus [Law of Obligations Act] art. 8(2) (Est.).
97. Id. at art. 9.
98. Id. at art. 18.
99. Kull, supra note 88, at 148 (stating that unlike German law, Estonia adopted a common concept of
breach modeled after the Principles of European Contract Law).
100. Obligations are excused in cases of Force Majeure, which are when circumstances are beyond the
control of the obligor. Vl1ahigusseadus [Law of Obligations Act] art. 103 (Est.).
101. See id. (stating that "it is presumed that non-performance is not excused").
102. See Kull, supra note 88, at 148 (giving an overview of Soviet civil-law theory of culpability in
analyzing cases of contractual breach).
103. See Win. Cary Wright, Force Majeure Clauses and the Insurability of Force Majeure Risks, 23
FALL CONSTRUCTION LAW. 16, 16 (2003) (defining force majeure as a term to describe a superior force event,
such as physical impossibility or frustration of purpose).
104. See Kull, supra note 88, at 150 (explaining that this provision is unlike CISG and U.S.
Restatements, all of which require an expression of will in order to terminate a contract due to force majeure).
105. V61a6igusseadus [Law of Obligations Act] art. 793 (Est.).
106. Id. at arts. 972, 978.
107. See id. at art. 978.
108. Granik, supra note 47, at 236.
109. V6la6igusseadus [Law of Obligations Act] art. 793 (Est.).
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4. Damages
The Law of Obligations Act introduces the right to compensation for damage
inflicted by nonperformance of an obligation." An aggrieved party may also seek a
penalty from the breaching party in the event of delayed performance."' Unlike the
United Nations Convention on the International Sale of Goods ("CISG"), the Law of
ObligationsAct does not provide for punitive damages in the event of a breach," 2 but
it does allow remedies such as specific performance,"3 the right to withhold
' 6

performance," 4 the right to dissolve a contract,' and the right to reduce price.
Except in cases of material breach,' the nonbreaching party has a right to cancel a
contract for good reason, only after granting the parties an additional period to
perform.'' In the case of fundamental breach, parties may cancel a contract without
granting any additional period of performance.' 9
By providing negative consequences for a breach of contract, parties will be
more likely to perform an obligation. The preferred Soviet method of ordering
specific performance cannot accommodate an aggrieved party when performance is
unlikely. Without negative consequences
20 imposed on the parties, a lack of incentive
to fulfill contractual obligations exists.'
The introduction of new legislation governing contract law established Estonia's
presence in Europe. By harmonizing contract principles with those found in Western
civil codes, the likelihood of success in international business is greater. 2' These
harmonized principles ensure that Estonians will not be taken by surprise when
contracting with foreign entities, as their laws will be familiar to their foreign
counterparts. As a result, foreign entities will feel more comfortable23 contracting
with Estonian businesses because they will not be dissuaded in the law.

110. Id. at art. 101.
111. Id.
112. Kull, supra note 88, at 147 n.22.
113. See V61a6igusseadus [Law of Obligations Act] art. 108 (Est.); see also UNIDROIT, supra note 34, at
art. 7.2.1-7.2.2 (stating that specific performance is not always justified and monetary obligations are always
performable).
114. See Vla6igusseadus [Law of Obligations Act] arts. 110-11 (Est.); see also Kull, supra note 88, at
154 (stating that under the old civil code, the right to this remedy was only allowed in limited circumstances).
115. See V61a6igusseadus [Law of Obligations Act] art. 116 (Est.); see also Kull, supra note 88, at 157
(explaining that wording in old civil code did not clearly define circumstances that allow dissolution as a
remedy).
116. V61abigusseadus [Law of Obligations Act] art. 112 (Est.).
117. This is referred to as a "fundamental breach," which deprives the injured party its expectation,
except in cases where there were unforeseeable consequences. See id. at art. 11 6(2)(l)-(5).
118. Id. at art. 116(4).
119. Estonia adds intentional and gross negligence as a definition for fundamental breach contrary to the
CISG, German, or Dutch civil codes. See id. at art. 116(6).
120.

IOFFE, supra note 46, at 176.

121.
122.
123.

See discussion infra Part V.
See infra text accompanying notes 249-260.
See infra text accompanying notes 255-260
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III. ENSURING CONTRACT ENFORCEMENT
Ensured success of new contract legislation is largely dependent upon the
enforceability of agreements. Judicial reform, by way of the newly enacted
Courts Act,'2 4 is a positive step towards the establishment of an independent
judiciary'25 capable of ensuring the enforcement of business contracts. Despite
continued cooperation with the Ministry of Justice, 2 6 the Courts Act provides
Estonia with the2 necessary legislative steps to improve the effectiveness of the
judicial branch.'
By establishing the necessary legislation to ensure separation of powers, the
judiciary can act without influence from the executive branch.' 21 Judicial
independence guarantees that the judges will be held accountable and are less
susceptible to corruption. 9 Furthermore, heightened requirements for judicial
service ensures that legislation will be interpreted logically and more
predictably,' 30 and concrete disciplinary regulations ensure that judges who
cannot conform to new regulations will be appropriately penalized.''
A.

Soviet Judicial Society

Socialist legal theory emphasized the importance of written law and
considers it to be the only correct source of legal decisions.' 2 Socialist theory
views law as the result of carefully planned criteria that is to be governed by the

124.
125.

Kohtute seadus [KS] [Courts Act] (Est.).
See Julia Laffranque, Dissenting Opinion and Judicial Independence, VIll JURIDICA
INTERNATIONAL 162, 167 (2003), available at http://www.juridica.ee/intemational en.php?document=en/
intemational/2003/1/65316.SUM.php (stating that only an independent judge can guarantee the recognition of
the rule of law).
126. Continued oversight by the Ministry of Justice was noted as concerns during the EU accession
process, despite the fact that most judges were publicly regarded as politically impartial. See FREEDOM HOUSE,
NATIONS IN TRANSIT 2002: COUNTRY REPORT OF ESTONIA 175 (2002) [hereinafter NATIONS IN TRANSIT 2002],
available at http://unpan l.un.orglintradoc/groups/public/documents/nispacee/unpan007948.pdf; see also JUDICIAL
INDEPENDENCE, supra note 16, at 161 (stating that the Ministry of Justice is the appointed spokesperson for the
judiciary as the judicial branch does not have an official body authorized to speak on its behalf).
127. See OPEN SOCIETY INSTITUTE, MONITORING EU ACCESSION PROCESS: JUDICIAL CAPACITY IN
ESTONIA 95 (2002) [hereinafter JUDICIAL CAPACITY]. But see NATIONS IN TRANSIT 2002, supra note 126, at
175 (explaining that the draft Courts Act drew harsh criticism from judges for failure to remedy the level of
management bestowed upon the Ministry of Justice and allowing judges to work within the Ministry of Justice,
which could possibly exacerbate existing problems of judicial independence).
128. Rait Maruste, Estonia: Leading Central Europe in Judicial Reform, INTERNATIONAL JUDICIAL
OBSERVER, January 1996, at 3.
129. Bradley L. Milkwick, Feeling for Rocks While Crossing the River: The Gradual Evolution of
Chinese Law, 14 J. TRANSNAT'L L. & POL'Y 289, 303 (2005).
130. See Kohtute seadus [KS] [Courts Act] art. 54(1)(Est.).
131. Id. at art. 88.
132. Zdenek Kuhn, Worlds Apart: Western and Central European Judicial Culture at the Onset of the
European Enlargement,52 AM. J. COMP. L. 531, 541 (2004).
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Communist Party. 33 Statutory interpretation was considered a mechanical

process, and any judicial interpretation outside of written language was
considered unacceptable.'34 The theory behind such a straightforward approach to
legal texts was that this would discourage judges from altering the will of the
ruling class, as in other bourgeois societies, where judges often create laws by
interpretation.'35
Judges were not admired and they lacked the same prestige as those in
comparable positions held in other Western societies. 36 The judiciary was underfunded 137 and under-qualified, and therefore did not have the resources available
to properly handle complex cases. 13' Any citizen over the age of twenty-five
could be elected as a judge, and appointments were made based on legal,
political, and personal qualifications. 3 9 Although many of them had
obtained
40
higher legal education, this was not a requirement for judicial service.
Judges were appointed for a five-year term, and could be recalled by their
constituency, the agency that elected them, or by criminal charges.' 4' Oversight
by the Ministry of Justice was problematic for the insurance of judicial
independence. 42 The role of the Ministry of Justice was not only to provide
organizational discretion over the court system,' 3 but also to ensure that the
judiciary was acting as an extension of the executive branch.' 44 The lack of
separate powers made judges less likely to rule in favor of justice for fear that
they would be reprimanded if they ruled against the party.
B. The Courts Act
Legislative reforms in Estonia have introduced new methods of adjudication,
including constitutional review "4' and administrative court proceedings. 46 The
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.
138.

Id.
Id. at 543.
Id. at 547-48.
Id. at 549.
Id.
See id. at 555; see also Paul H. Rubin, Growing a Legal System in the Post-Communist Economies,

27 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 1, 15 (1994).

139.
140.

W.E. BUTLER, SOVIET LAW 101 (2d ed. 1988).
Id.

141.

AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, A CONTRAST BETWEEN THE LEGAL SYSTEMS IN THE UNITED

247 (1968).
See JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE, supra note 16, at 150.
143. BUTLER, supra note 139, at 96.
144. See Maruste, supranote 128, at 3.
145. Kohtute seadus [KS] [Courts Act] art. 26(3) (Est.); Eesti Vabariigi p6hiseadus [EVP] [Constitution]
arts. 15, 152 (Est.).
146. Kohtute seadus [KS] [Courts Act] art. 18 (Est.). Administrative courts provide a venue for citizens
to file a complaint against the executive branch and thus offering a guarantee for protecting fundamental rights
and liberties. Constitutional review offers a check on the legislative branch by giving the courts jurisdiction to
declare laws unconstitutional. See Maruste, supra note 128, at 3.
STATES AND IN THE SOVIET UNION

142.
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47
new Courts Act provides that justice will be only administered by the courts'
4
and provides guarantees for an independent judiciary. 1 Judicial independence is
guaranteed by granting judges life tenure, 49 providing for the possibility of
removal from office,'5 ° and allowing the possibility of criminal charges to be
brought against judges who violate the law. 5 ' Provisions in the Constitution
supplement the Courts Act by establishing a constitutional guarantee for the
separation of powers. 5 2 To ensure that judges on the bench are sufficiently
qualified, new methods of training and removal have been introduced. Finally,
increased transparency ensures that the judiciary will be held accountable to the
public by allowing broad access to court operations and judgments."'

1. Judicial Independence
The new Courts Act lists several methods to guarantee the independence of
the judiciary. Judicial independence is guaranteed, by providing safeguards for
confidential deliberations'5 4 and by permitting judges to issue dissenting
opinions. 5 Judges are only allowed to hold judicial office, with an exception
made for participation in teaching and research positions. 5 6 Judges are not
permitted to hold the following positions: office in the legislature; member of a
political party;' 7 board of directors of a company; a trustee in bankruptcy; or
arbitrator. 58 The Courts Act further improves judicial independence by limiting
the position of Court Chairman to one consecutive term,' 9 which allows those in
147. See Kohtute seadus [KS] [Courts Act] art. 2(1) (Est.); see also Eesti Vabariigi p6hiseadus [EVP]
[Constitution] art. 16 (Est.).
148. Eesti Vabariigi p6hiseadus [EVP] [Constitution] art. 147 (Est.) (stating that guarantees for judicial
independence shall be provided by law). But see JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE, supra note 16, at 160 (explaining
that although the Courts Act improves the independence of judges as individuals, the act does not focus enough
on the independence of the judiciary as an institution).
149. See Kohtute seadus [KS] [Courts Act] art. 3(1) (Est.); see also Jaan Ginter, Guarantees of Judicial
Independence, I JURIDICA INTERNATIONAL 75, § 2 (1996), available at http://www.juridica.ee/intemational
_en.php?document=enlintemational/1996/l/6139.SUM.php (proposing that life tenure really means that judges
may serve until they reach a certain age).
150. Kohtute seadus [KS] [Courts Act] art.3(2) (Est.).
151. See id. at art.3(3)-3(4); see also Eesti Vabariigi pbhiseadus [EVP] [Constitution] art. 153 (Est.).
152. See Eesti Vabariigi p6hiseadus [EVP] [Constitution] art. 4 (Est.); see also FREEDOM HOUSE,
NATIONS IN TRANSIT 2003: COUNTRY REPORT OF ESTONIA 255 (2003) [hereinafter NATIONS IN TRANSIT 2003],
available at http://unpanl.un.org/intradoc/groups/public/documents/NISPAcee/UNPANO12419.pdf (asserting
that separation of powers is guaranteed by the constitution and is accepted in practice).
153. See JUDICIAL CAPACITY, supra note 127, at 100; see also Estonica, Judicial System, http://www.
estonica.org (last visited Mar. 27, 2006).
154. See Kohtute seadus [KS] [Courts Act] art. 72 (Est.); see also Laffranque, supra note 125, at 162.
155. See Laffranque, supra note 125, at 166.
156. Kohtute seadus [KS] [Courts Act] art. 49(1) (Est.).
157. This sharply contrasts the judicial branch under the Soviet system where the courts functioned
under the rule of the Communist party. See Maruste, supra note 128, at 3.
158. Kohtute seadus [KS] [Courts Act] art. 49 (Est.).
159. See id. at arts.12(9), 20(9), 24(9), 27(9).
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this position to be more independent because they are less susceptible
to the will
6
°
of the executive branch with hopes of guaranteeing their re-election.'
Judges are required to perform duties impartially and to refrain from
behaving in a way that would damage the reputation of the court.' 6' They are
subjected to a personal interview, during which the judge's examination
committee assesses the suitability of candidates for office.162 The integrity of the63
judicial branch is further ensured by requiring judges to pass a security check
and to take an oath swearing to faithfully administer justice in accordance with
the Constitution.'6" Only citizens of high moral character may be appointed as
judge.' 65 One cannot serve as a judge if (1) ever convicted of a criminal offense,
(2) removed from office of judge, (3) expelled from the Estonian Bar
Association, (4) disciplined while working in public service, or (5) declared
bankruptcy.' 66
The Constitution provides further guarantees of judicial independence. The
Constitution declares, "[t]he courts shall be independent in their activities and
shall administer justice in accordance with the [c]onstitution and the laws.' 67
Judges are appointed for life and may only be removed from office by judgment
from a court of law.' 68 The Constitution provides that the supreme court is
entrusted with constitutional review' 69 and may review lower court 7judgments,
0
which allows lower courts to be scrutinized if deciding cases unfairly.
2.

Training

Even with independence guaranteed, inexperienced judges may hinder the
effective implementation of new legislation. 7' Many of the Soviet-era judges

160. See JUDICIAL CAPACITY, supra note 127, at 96. But see Laffranque, supra note 125, at 168 (stating
that the requirement for re-election of the Constitutional Review Chamber requires the approval of the supreme
court sitting en banc, and consequently justices seeking re-election may rule pursuant to the will of their
colleagues on the supreme court).
161. Kohtute seadus [KS] [Courts Act] art. 70 (Est.).
162. Id. at art. 54(1).
163. Id. at art. 54(2).
164. Id. at art. 56.
165. Id.
166. Id. at art. 47.
167. Eesti Vabariigi pthiseadus [EVP] [Constitution] art. 146 (Est.).
168. Id. at art. 147.
169. Contrary to many other European countries, Estonia did not create a separate constitutional court,
instead entrusting this task to its supreme court. See id. at art. 149; see also Bojan Bugaric, Courts as PolicyMakers: Lessons from Transition, 42 HARV. INT'L L.J. 247, 247 (2001) (providing that constitutional courts are
elements of almost all Eastern European judiciaries).
170. See Eesti Vabariigi pthiseadus [EVP] [Constitution] arts. 149, 152 (Est.) (stating that the supreme
court may invalidate any law that conflicts with the "provisions and spirit" of the constitution).
171. See JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE, supra note 16, at 157 (citing the EU Regular Report on Estonia's
progress towards accession 1999 that "inexperienced judges continue to pose major difficulties for the judicial
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were removed; therefore, the judicial branch that emerged is largely young and
inexperienced. 72' The training of new judges no longer rests with the Ministry of
Justice; it is now vested in a new Council for Judicial Training.'73 The Council for
Judicial Training consists of two judges from each level: one representative from
the Prosecutor's Office, one representative from the Ministry of Justice, and one
representative from the University of Tartu. 7 4 A foundation has been established
to govern all aspects of judicial training, including: creating protocols and
training strategy; implementing procedures; providing a program for judge's
examinations; and ensuring the program continues to improve by providing an
annual review of the training program for The Training Council." 5
3. Removal
Any guarantees for judicial independence may be undermined if there are not
proper procedures for removal of judges on disciplinary grounds. 7 6 Disciplinary
proceedings may be initiated against a judge for failing to perform official
duties.'77 The Courts Act provides a list of appropriate punishments" s and
enumerates details of procedure for commencing disciplinary action against a
judge. 79 Authority to conduct disciplinary proceedings is entrusted
to a
80
Justice.
of
Ministry
the
with
rests
longer
no
and
Disciplinary Chamber
Judges may be removed from office for a variety of reasons. A judge may
be removed from office after three years if found unsuitable for office by the
supreme court sitting en banc. 82 Judges may also be removed pursuant to a
decision rendered by the Disciplinary Chamber, or if the judge has been
convicted of a crime. 83

system. Justice in lower level courts continues to be unsatisfactory, as there are many new, inexperienced and
overburdened judges.").
172. Maruste, supra note 128, at 3.
173. JUDICIAL CAPACITY, supra note 127, at 97 (stating that the new Courts Act transfers responsibility
for training from the Ministry of Justice to the Council for Judicial Training).
174. Kohtute seadus [KS] [Courts Act] art. 44 (Est.).
175. Id. atart. 44(2).
176. Ginter, supra note 149, § 3.
177. See Kohtute seadus [KS] [Courts Act] art. 87 (Est.) (an indecent act is also grounds for disciplinary
action against a judge).
178. Id. at art. 88.
179. Id. at arts.87-98.
180. See NATIONS IN TRANSIT 2003, supra note 153, at 256; see also Kohtute seadus [KS] [Courts Act]
art. 93 (Est.) (stating that the Disciplinary Chamber shall consist of five judges from each of the three levels of
the court system).
181. Judges may be released at the request of another judge, at the age of retirement, due to unsuitability
for office, for health reasons, due to liquidation of the court, or "if facts become evident which according to law
preclude the appointment of the person as a judge." See Kohtute seadus [KS] [Courts Act] art. 99 (Est.).
182. Id. at art. 100.
183. Id. at art. 101.
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For the most part, reforms taken by Estonia are considered a positive step
towards an efficient judiciary' and can only improve as the judiciary becomes
accustomed to new legislation.' 5 Court decisions are being complied with, and
more cases are being upheld on appeal, which indicates that they are being
decided correctly in the lower courts. 8 6 Although increasing the enforceability of

court decisions consequently increases the number of lawsuits, sources show that
the judiciary has adapted well to the new legislation, resulting in a decreasing
backlog of court cases.'8 ' Facilities have improved,'
and judges are now
compensated at considerably higher than the average salary,'8 9 which may
indicate a growing appreciation for the value of a competent judiciary.
IV.

CONTINUED SUCCESS OF LEGISLATIVE REFORM

The success of new laws is impossible without the proper training of
attorneys working within their respective legal systems, and a quality education

being pursued by future lawyers of that region.9 With the collapse of
communism came an increased demand for law degrees. 19' This increased
demand for law degrees resulted in the creation of many unaccredited law
schools that awarded diplomas
92 without effectively training students to deal with a
environment.
legal
changing
Integration with the rest of Europe brings to light additional complications
that may arise when Estonian lawyers practice in other nations, and vice versa.' 93
To learn the appropriate analytical tools, students in Europe need to be
sufficiently educated so that they can effectively use foreign law as a variation of

184. JUDICIAL CAPACITY, supra note 127, at 96. But see JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE, supra note 16, at 156
(suggesting that the success of judicial reforms may be undermined by the lack of public debate and concern
regarding declining confidence in the judicial branch, which does not encourage politicians to take a decisive
step towards building a completely independent judiciary).
185. See JUDICIAL CAPACITY, supra note 127, at 96 (stating that the potential for the new legal
provisions in the Courts Act will depend upon effective implementation).
186. NATIONS IN TRANSIT 2002, supra note 126, at 175.
187. See id. at 174; see also The World Bank, Doing Business, Enforcing Contracts, http://doing
business.org/ExploreTopics/Enforcing Contracts/ (last visited Mar. 27, 2006) (comparing the number of days
that is required to enforce a contract in Estonia (150) to the number of days required to enforce a contract in the
Russian Federation (330)); NATIONS IN TRANSIT 2003, supra note 153, at 256 (stating that judicial decisions are
being effectively implemented and the collection of money in court cases is improving).
188. See JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE, supra note 16, at 169; see also Judicial Capacity, supra note 127, at
105.
189. JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE, supra note 16, at 170.
190. Varul, supra note 9, at 117.
191. See CEELI Legal Education Reform Program, CEELI Focal Areas, www.abanet.org/
ceeli/areas/legaled.html (last visited Mar. 27, 2006).
192. Id.
193. Ana M. Lopez-Rodriguez, Towards a European Civil Code Without a Common European Legal
Culture? The Link Between Law, Language and Culture, 29 BROOKLYN J. INT'L L. 1195, 1216 (2004).
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basic principles they already know.' 94 One author even suggests that students
should be taught to view respective national rules as a variation of a larger
European law and should be encouraged to study abroad to gain an adequate
understanding of foreign law.' 9
A. University of Tartu
In addition to international legal opportunities created by foreign study and
EU integration, the enhancement of the legal curriculum at the University of
Tartu has been underway since Estonia declared independence in 1991.196 The
Faculty of Law reformed the curriculum, using examples from other European
law schools, while also taking into account the independent needs of local
Estonian lawyers. 97 Fortunately, many of the current faculty members assisted in
the legislative reform process and therefore have first-hand experience working
with many of the new laws currently in force. 98 These professors have multiplied
the number of legal publications in Estonia, and foreign professors have been
able to step in where the current faculty cannot provide an adequate level of
education. In addition, the practical training aspect of legal education has shifted,
so that legal scholars obtain a first-hand look at the inner workings of the
Estonian court system. These changes have improved the level of legal education
at the University of Tartu, so that students will be prepared to work in an
international environment.
1. Curriculum
The new curriculum was devised after careful consideration, taking into
account opinions from graduates, practicing lawyers, and faculty members from
foreign universities.'9 9 The new curriculum has increased the number of private
law courses, 200 and includes courses relating to international law, European law,
and also courses in basic legal theory. 21' Not only do students gain an education
based on practical legal concepts, but also they are taught basic legal theory, so

194. Id.
195. Id.
196. See generally Peep Pruks, Academic Legal Education in Estonia: Current State and Perspectives
(Faculty of Law of the University of Tartu), I JURIDICA INTERNATIONAL 139 (1996), availableat http://www.
juridica.ee/international-en.php?document=en/international/1996/l/6165.SUM.php (providing an overview of
changes in the educational system at the University of Tartu).
197. Id. § 1.3.
198. See id.; see also Byrne, supra note 30, at 458.
199. See Pruks, supra note 196, § 3.1; see also Merusk, supra note 23, § 6.1.
200. Courses in private law now constitute almost half of the prerequisites at the expense of legal
historical disciplines and foreign language courses. With regard to the new concepts encompassed in the Law of
Obligations Act, new courses were prepared. See Merusk, supranote 23, at Annex 1.
201. Pruks, supra note 197, § 3.1.
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that they may adapt their legal knowledge to accommodate new legal principles
if laws and legal norms change in the future. °2
Influences from abroad have greatly affected the changes made to Estonian
law school curriculum. 2 3 The restructuring of the law school curriculum was
designed to accompany Estonia's integration into Europe.2 O Government
regulations even designated funds to cover the cost of implementing a new
department to concentrate only on EU law. °5 Students have been able to study
abroad,2' and visiting foreign lecturers have contributed in areas where current
course options are deficient or lacking a faculty member with the appropriate
level of expertise. 207
2.

PracticalTraining

The practical training aspect of the law curriculum has also changed to allow
students the opportunity to gain a more effective level of experience in line with
the everyday needs of practicing attorneys in Estonia. Instead of training with
local lawyers, students now participate in a six-week practical training within the
court system, which is coordinated by a member of the faculty. 2°9 This allows
students to gain insight into the substantive and procedural issues that arise in the
Estonian court system, and further their knowledge of the internal workings of
Estonian law and how it is applied in practice.
3.

Faculty

The quality of the faculty at the University of Tartu has also improved,
thereby providing additional benefits to the quality of legal education guiding the
future lawyers of Estonia. Although many of the new faculty members are
comparatively young, many have high-level degrees from foreign universities
and foreign lecturers fill in where the current faculty cannot provide the adequate
level of education. 211

202. Id.
203. Id. § 3.2.
204. Id.
205. See id. § 5.1; see also Pruks, supra note 197, § 3.2 (explaining that the curriculum enables students
to learn main concepts, principles, and theories that can be applied throughout Europe).
206. Pruks, supra note 197, at § 2.6.
207. See id. § 3.2 (stating that the assistance of visiting lecturers have allowed the faculty to implement
new teaching methods and properly develop their courses).
208. See id. § 3.6.
209. See id.
210. See id.
211. See id. § 3.2; see also Merusk, supra note 23, § 5.1.
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The Open Estonia Foundation has contributed vastly to aiding the faculty in
publishing study materials,"2 and this has resulted in an increased volume of
study materials." 3 Additionally, the faculty publishes a law journal, Juridica,and
its English edition, Juridica International, that
facilitates the continuing legal
2 4
thought and discussion legal policies in Estonia.
While the legal education is still improving, changes that have already taken
place have assisted the successful progression of legal society in Estonia.
Students have placed well in international moot court competitions," 5 and the law
school is attracting foreign students to study in Estonia, which may indicate that
Estonian legal education is thought to be comparable to that of other European
educational institutions. 6
B. Riga Graduate School of Law
Programs that allow students to study law in foreign countries may enhance
the ability of students in Estonia to compete with other European students in the
legal field. One such program is already underway to help Baltic lawyers
supplement their legal education already obtained in their native country and
become acquainted with the principles used in Western legal systems.2 7 The
Foundation of the Riga Graduate School of Law ("RGSL") offers students an
211
education based on the rule of law, human rights, and principles of democracy.
The program is designed to enable legal professionals to adapt successfully to
legislative changes occurring in the Baltic region. 2' 9 RGSL boldly states that its
mission is "to function as a catalyst for change in the legal systems of the Baltic
, ,2
States.
RGSL offers a fifteen-month LLM program that is geared towards providing
recent law graduates from the Baltic countries with an understanding of
international law, so that they will be prepared to practice in an international
legal environment. 22' Although most of its students come from Latvia, RGSL
hopes that the program eventually achieves an equal division of students from all

212.

University of Tartu Faculty of Law, General Information, Development Plan, www.iuridicum.ee

(last visited Mar. 27, 2006).
213.

Merusk, supra note 23, § 4.2.

214. University of Tartu Faculty of Law, General Information, Development Plan, www.iuridicum.ee
(last visited Mar. 27, 2006).
215.

Merusk, supra note 23, § 2.5.

216.

See id. (In 1998, there were nine foreign students).

217. See Norbert Reich & Linda Freiman, Preparingfor the European Future of Law Studies in the
Baltic Countries, 22 PENN ST. INT'L L. REV. 101, 102 (2003).
218.

Id. at 101.

219.

Riga Graduate School, Philosophy, http://rgsl.edu.lv/ (last visited Mar. 27, 2006).

220.

Reich & Freiman, supranote 217, at 102.

221.

Id.

2007 / Estonia: A Model For Economic Success in TransitionEconomies
three Baltic countries."' The program at RGSL boasts that recent graduates are
fully prepared for careers in both the public and private sector.223
The changes adopted at the University of Tartu and the introduction of
international education can only encourage future Estonian lawyers to
incorporate new laws and legal concepts into everyday practice. These future
lawyers will be the parties drafting contracts on behalf of Estonian businesses
that hope to trade internationally. The ensured success of legislative reforms in
Estonia is largely dependent on how well these new concepts can be incorporated
into Estonian legal culture, and the reformation of legal education is an efficient
way to ensure assimilation of foreign concepts.
V. HARMONIZED CONTRACT LAW IN EUROPE
Legislative changes that have taken place in Estonia will only continue to
improve the business environment in Estonia. In addition to benefits arising from
established legal concepts in other nations, the harmonization of legal systems
224
alleviates uncertainty that can arise from interacting with foreign entities . The
certainty that results when governing rules are similar can have a beneficial
impact on all parties.2 Differences in interpretation will be fewer, and mandatory
226
terms used by contracting parties in different nations will be used consistently.
More importantly, transaction costs involved in conducting transnational
business will decrease, as there will be less need to obtain foreign legal advice to
227
ensure complete comprehension of every contractual transaction. Furthermore,
the existence of a common legislative framework will ensure that both parties
will enter into transactions with a similar understanding.228
Some argue that harmonization is not necessarily beneficial for business.2 2 9
They fear that a harmonized contract law will result in the loss of a legal culture,
which is important and specific to each nation. 230 Furthermore, they argue that it
is unnecessary, considering that the parties have the option to select a choice of
law clause or the CISG to govern. 23' European Community ("EC") legislation is
already partially harmonized, in the form of directives, and opponents argue that

222.
223.
224.
225.
226.

Id. at 104.
Id.atllI.
See infra text accompanying notes 249-60.
See infra text accompanying notes 249-60
See generally Dominik Kallweit, Towards a European Contract law: Fora Prosperous Future of

InternationalTrade, 35 VICT. U. WELLINGTON L. REV. 269, 275-77 (2004).

227.
228.
229.
230.
231.

Id. at227.
Id.
See infra Part Vb.
See infra Part Vbi.
See infra Part Vbii.

Global Business & Development Law Journal/ Vol. 19
this legislation provides enough protection for consumers without a complete
overhaul of national contract legislation. 232
Harmonization of contract laws is so important that the EU is considering
adopting supranational legislation to govern contractual relations in Europe.233
The introduction of a Common Frame of Reference ("CFR") could possibly
increase the likelihood of a successful common European market. Because
Estonia has already harmonized laws governing contract formation with other
European models, the adoption of a CFR may not be a difficult transition.234
A. Benefits of a Harmonized ContractLaw
Prospects for membership in the EU provided the incentives necessary for
struggling Eastern European nations to reform existing legislation.235 Competition
with larger foreign markets and political pressure from other European nations
can be a powerful motivation for small countries, such as Estonia, to conform to
Western legal systems.236 The unification of Europe initially developed in pursuit
of establishing a common market.2 ' Furthermore, increased globalization and
modem technology have heightened the need for cooperative methods of
transacting business throughout the world.238
By harmonizing contract principles with those encompassed by other
member states, the legislative reforms introduced by the Law of ObligationsAct
and the Courts Act enable business transactions between Estonia and other
member states to function more smoothly by providing clear rules and ensuring
consequences for failure to uphold obligations. 239 Harmonization of contract laws
enables Estonia to align legal foundations governing concepts, general principles,
and adjudicative methods with the rest of Europe to eventually create a common

232.
233.

See infra Part Vbii.
COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES,

A

MORE COHERENT EUROPEAN CONTRACT LAW,

AN ACTION PLAN 4 (2003) [hereinafter ACTION PLAN], available at http://europa.eu.int/comm/consumers/

consint/safeshop/fairbus.pract/cont law/actionplanen.htm.
234. The Principles of European Contract Law were used as a model for the Estonian Civil Code and
will likely be used as a model for a Common Frame of Reference. See Lando, supra note 71, at 383.
235. See Appelquist, supra note 8, at 80 (stating that the use of foreign legal systems in Estonia were
implemented both voluntarily and by inducement from multilateral organizations, such as the EU and NATO).
236. See Kull, supra note 13, at 32.
237. See Kallweit, supra note 226, at 269-70.
238. See Lando, supra note 71, at 379 (proposing that the increased use of electronic communication has
increased world trade); see also Vivian Grosswald Curran, Re-Membering in the International World, 34
HOFSTRA L. REV. 93, 101 (stating that contacts are multiplying because of the EU and modem increase of
communication).
239. See COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, JOINT RESPONSE OF THE COMMISSION ON
EUROPEAN CONTRACT LAW AND THE STUDY GROUP ON A EUROPEAN CIVIL CODE v (2001) [hereinafter JOINT
RESPONSE], availableat http://www.sgecc.net/media/download/stellungnahme-komission_5_finall .pdf (stating
that costs encountered by businesses can be eliminated by harmonization of private law in Europe).
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legal culture.24° Although legal diversity does not hinder international business
cooperation in itself, differences in substantive law governing many aspects of
transactional business can. 4' To achieve optimum efficiency, unified rules that
govern mandatory and standard provisions are essential.242
1. MandatoryRules
Differences among the laws governing mandatory rules of the respective
contracting parties may result in the disadvantage of one of the parties. 243
Differences regarding contract formation, content, validity, interpretation,
performance, the precise ending of an obligation, and the presence of unfair
conditions all pose significant obstacles to reaching fair and legally binding
contracts." In practice, the differences among the contract laws governing
mandatory provisions may not always be clear on their face, and therefore, are
not appropriately negotiated to give parties an opportunity to bypass potential
obstacles during business transactions. 245
The establishment of uniform rules with regard to contract regulation would
eliminate market barriers and therefore encourage further economic integration.246
Differences in contract legislation tend to affect small- and medium-sized

business enterprises more so than large enterprises because the former often lack
the resources necessary to afford competent legal advice and do not have
sufficient bargaining power to impose legal requirements on the other party. 247
2.

Default Rules

The process of drafting and reviewing contracts is often expensive and can
increase transaction costs. 2 48 Difficulties arise when determining which terms are

240. See Lopez-Rodriguez, supra note 194, at 1206 (stating that the key to determining how legal rules
are understood and applied is dependent on legal culture).
241. See Kallweit, supra note 226, at 275-77 (presenting a case study example on how a disadvantaged
transaction creates an obstacle to cross-border trade in the communities); see also Lando, supra note 71, at 379
(proposing that many parties do not focus enough attention on the governing laws of the parties with whom they
contract).
242. Ugo Mattei, Efficiency and Equal Protection in the New European Contract Law: Mandatory,
Default and Enforcement Rules, 39 VA. J. INT'L L. 537, 543 (1999).

243. See JOINT RESPONSE, supra note 239, at 6 (stating that costs encountered by businesses can be
eliminated by harmonization of private law in Europe); see also Kallweit, supra note 226, at 275-77 (providing
examples of differences among European codes, where differences in the most basic elements of contract
formation may result in substantial disadvantage to one party if that party is unclear of specific requirements).
244. Id. at 275-77.
245.

ACTION

PLAN,

supra note 233, at 10.

246. Kallweit, supra note 226, at 274.
247. See id. at 275; see also ACTION PLAN, supra note 233, at 10.
248. See Mattei, supra note 242, at 543 (explaining that many resources are spent on the specifics of
legal reform instead of other areas of government).
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mandatory and those that are standard default rules. 49 When default rules differ
depending on the national laws of each contracting party, transaction costs
increase.5 ° Contract terms may have to be drafted more than once to satisfy the
different requirements of each party's national law governing those provisions." '
To do so effectively, contracting parties will be forced to expend significant
resource to determine their respective rights under any applicable foreign law.252
Failure to do so may result in one party entering into a contractual relationship
with another without a complete understanding of their legal rights and
obligations.253
These concerns are particularly troublesome for small- and medium-sized
enterprises that may not have the financial resources available; therefore, these
enterprises will be disadvantaged the most.25 4 This disadvantage may discourage
parties from entering into cross-border economic transactions. 255 The mere
possibility of legal uncertainty may be sufficiently troublesome to discourage
parties from transacting with foreign parties. 256 The lack of affordable legal
advice allows for the possibility that parties will trade without full knowledge of
their rights or be discouraged because of legal uncertainty.257 The cost of
negotiating around certain standard terms may be too great to warrant certain
transactions.2 s Consequently, even terms that are not legally mandatory may
become mandatory because parties cannot afford to negotiate around them.5 9
3. Enforcement Rules
In addition to achieving uniformity with regard to mandatory rules and
default provisions, the harmonization of contract law can facilitate the
enforcement of contracts. 260 A strong contract law may provide the incentives
necessary to encourage parties to perform under the contract.2 6 Judicial systems
may not provide the best mechanism for contract enforcement due to substantial
delay and expense.262 In terms of enforcement, contracting with nations that have
249. Id. at 544.
250. Kallweit, supra note 226, at 281.
251. Id. at 282.
252. JOINT RESPONSE, supra note 239, at 6.
253. Id.
254. ACTION PLAN, supra note 233, at 10.
255. Id.
256. JOINT RESPONSE, supra note 239, at 6 (stating that "apparent differences can be as damaging to
confidence as real ones").
257. Id. at 9 (explaining this is especially so in older legal systems where the codified law cannot be
adequately understood without full comprehension of how the law has been interpreted by judges).
258.

ACTION PLAN, supra note 233, at 10.

259.
260.
261.
262.

Id. at l1.
Mattei, supra note 242, at 565.
Id. at 567.
Id.
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different standards can lead to injustice. 263 The lower legal standards of some
laws will offer an advantage to local business and provide an incentive for others
to relocate to nations with lower standards. 2' 6 By harmonizing contract laws,
nations no longer have an incentive to seek out a forum with lenient standards, as
the laws will be the same.
B. Arguments against Harmonized ContractLaw
Many scholars oppose harmonization for fear that the transposition of laws is
often ineffective.265 It is believed that certain ways cannot be completely
abolished by simply enacting new laws. 266 Additionally, legal harmonization may
eliminate certain elements that are important to a nation's own legal culture.267
Furthermore, opponents argue that harmonization is unnecessary because
contracting parties are able to choose the applicable law or apply CISG rules,
which would enable nations to keep their national legal culture intact while
facilitating transnational contracting.268 Lastly, opponents claim that since
contract laws are already somewhat harmonized by implementing EC directives,
any further harmonization is unnecessary.
1. The Loss of a Legal Culture
Opponents of a harmonized contract law favor legal diversity. They argue
270
that a unified approach to legal reform will eliminate a national legal culture
and inhibit competition among international economic players.27 Many
contracting parties may elect to trade with another party, depending on which
parties' national law may prove to be the most advantageous to them.2 2
Additionally, many argue that despite a harmonized legal text, interpretations
may vary, and therefore, uncertainty exists despite efforts to encourage
foreseeability by unifying textual differences. 273 However, cases that have
interpreted CISG provisions demonstrate that many courts will interpret
263. Id.
264. Id.
265. Erin Orucu, Law as Transposition, 51 ICLQ 205, 205 (2002) (explaining that "transplanted
institution continues to live on in its old habitat").
266. Id.
267. P.G. Monateri, The Weak Law: Contaminations and Legal Cultures, 13 TRANSANT'L L. &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 575, 576 (2003).
268. See infra text accompanying notes 276-288.
269. See infra text accompanying notes 289-299.
270. French opponents to a unified European Civil Code argue that the national civil codes reflect each
state's culture. See Curran, supra note 238, at 110.
271. Kallweit, supranote 227, at 282.
272. See id. at 271-75 (providing a brief summary of certain discrepancies among member states
regarding basic contractual transactions).
273. Id. at 286.

556

Global Business & Development Law Journal/ Vol. 19
principles uniformly.274 Concerns that interpretations will be muddled by national
legislatures could be resolved by including a list of defined terms to be used by
courts in contract interpretation.
2. Alternative Solutions
Opponents of a harmonized contract law rely on choice of law clauses275 and
international conventions276 as a basis for suggesting that nations may retain their
own civil codes, yet manage to ameliorate any differences that may arise from
transnational contracts by choosing which law will apply to any given
transaction. EC Directives already provide a minimum level of harmonization
with regard to certain areas that need to be addressed.277 Additionally, many
believe that competition among market participants will result in the selfregulation of contract provisions because parties themselves will want to make
transactions run as smoothly as possible and therefore willingly conform to each
other's law .7 Given the cumbersome and expensive nature of creating new
legislation, 27 9 proponents of this theory suggest that self-regulatory measures will
respond to problems created by differences in contract laws more rapidly. °
Choice of law clauses do not remedy problems related to different mandatory
terms since these terms govern regardless of the choice of law. 28' This is
especially problematic with the increasing use of e-commerce. 2 Additionally,
choice of law clauses are not always possible. 3 The determination of the
preferred law involves considerable expense and may depend on whether one
party has sufficient bargaining power to demand a particular law they choose to
govern the transaction.
Furthermore, choice of law clauses regarding
contractual transactions have no bearing on different laws regarding the transfer
of property, which is often different among member states. 25

274. Lando, supra note 71, at 387.
275. ACTION PLAN, supra note 233, at 10.
276. Such as the CISG. See Hugh Beale, The Development of European Private Law and the European
Commission 's Action Plan on ContractLaw, X JURIDICA INTERNATIONAL 4, 7 (2005) (stating .that although the
CISG may be a solution for parties who want to specify a certain set of rules, the CISG only applies to the sale
of goods and has not been ratified by some countries). But see Kallweit, supra note 226, at 279 (stating that
"most commercial contracts contain a clause excluding application of the CISG").
277. See supra text accompanying notes 181-190.
278. Kallweit, supra note 226, at 278.
279. See id. at 290-91 (suggesting that the fear is that the creation of a European Code is so burdensome
that compromises are inevitable therefore resulting in lower-quality legislation).
280. Id. at 278.
281. ACTION PLAN, supra note 233, at 10.
282. Id.
283. Id.
284. Id.
285. Id. at 12.
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3.

EC Directives

Current contract law legislation in the EC is enacted in the form of a
directive.

6

These directives provide the minimum standards that member states

are required to adopt into their respective national legislation.

7

Minimum

harmonization allows member states to adopt higher domestic standards and

therefore, despite a consistent base in certain areas of contract laws, each national
law may vary in application. 8 Many argue that because there is already some
level of harmonization, further harmonization is unnecessary. 289
However, many of the directives have not been sufficiently defined, which

leaves considerable discretion to national legislators in implementing these
directives.29 Even when terms are defined, there is not enough consistency
among all the directives so that the same definition is used throughout

interpretation of all directives. 9 ' Furthermore, a growing number of directives
have caused legislation in the field of contract law to become too specific and
fragmented, resulting in an incoherent system of rules to be followed by member
states 2 Although in certain situations these directives may be good examples of

comparative legal study that work towards a successful common market, other
directives have been criticized for not being created so that the interests of all
member states are adequately represented.294
C. The Needfor FurtherHarmonization

Although most European contract laws are relatively similar, the expanding
EU has now become large enough that legal diversity relating to national contract

286. Peter Schlechtriem, EC Directives, Common Principles,and Law Reforms, 75 TUL. L. REV. 1177,
1178 (2001).
287. Thomas Mollers, EuropeanDirectives on Civil Law, 18 TUL. EURO. Civ. LF 1, 16 (2003).
288. Minimum harmonization may provide little incentive for heightened standards as this may result in
"reverse discrimination" of national products. See Mel Kenny, Globalization, Interlegality and Europeanized
ContractLaw, 21 PENN ST. INT'L L. REV. 569, 575 (2003); see also ACTION PLAN, supra note 233, at 7 (stating
that two legislative approaches to the same directive may lead to inconsistencies).
289. Kallweit, supra note 226, at 270.
290. See ACTION PLAN, supra note 233, at 8.
291. Id.
292. See Curran, supra note 238, at 106; see also Kallweit, supra note 226, at 280; ACTION PLAN, supra
note 233, at 7 (explaining that differences in the interpretation of withdrawal periods in the Directives on
Doorstep Selling, Timeshare, Distance Selling, and Distance Selling of Financial Services is one example of
how minimum requirements can result in divergent rules regarding the EC directives).
293. See Schlechtriem, supra note 287, at 1179 (offering the Products Liability Directive of 1985 as an
example of good comparative legislation).
294. In comparison, those who drafted the Principles of European Contract Law (PECL) were mainly
scholars, and therefore, did not represent particular governments. See Lando, supra note 71, at 380; see also
Schlechtriem, supra note 287, at 1180 (explaining that the German view on the consumer sales directive
resulted because of heavy German representation by those who drafted the directive).
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laws is noticeably problematic.9 The importance of harmonized legislation is so
great that the EU is in the process of determining whether to begin legislative
reform on an international level.296 If the EU does take legislative action with
regard to contract legislation, the current law governing contracts in Estonia
provides an excellent basis for a smooth transition into an integrated European
contract law.297 Because the Law of ObligationsAct was developed by comparing
model codes 98 and other European civil codes, 99 the imposition of further

changes in the field of contract law may not be dramatic enough to further
complicate any current legislative changes relating to contract law in Estonia.
The reformed Law of ObligationsAct will provide the necessary groundwork for
a successful transition to a greater European Civil Code.3°°
A CFR will be used to set forth common principles and define terminology
that is necessary to further consistency in contractual negotiations in Europe. °1 A
CFR will eliminate differences in national contract laws, and could be used as a
model for national legislatures to alter current provisions regarding contractual
relations. 3°2 The use of standard terms in contractual relations will lower costs
303
that are involved in negotiating specific contract terms. By providing these
standard terms, a CFR will provide the best solution to current problems relating
to divergent definitions and currently fragmented EU directives, which need to be
simplified. 3"' As there has already been considerable research in this area, it will
be only necessary to begin new research where it has been discovered that
something was inadequately covered.
Most agree that the current body of EC legislation regarding contract law
needs to be improved. 3°6 At the very least, the current legislation regarding
contract law needs to be adjusted to remedy the current discrepancies among
basic contracts principles.0 7 Uniform definitions of essential terms must be
created and gaps in current legislation need to be filled.3"8 Consistent terminology

295. Kallweit, supra note 226, at 271.
296. ACTION PLAN, supra note 233, at 4.
297. See Kull, supra note 13, at 32 (stating that the success of transformation depends on how
effectively the existing legal system can be reformed).
298. Such as CISG, PECL, and UNIDROIT Principles. See Kull, supra note 187, 5.
299. Vaml, supra note 9, at 108.
300. A European Civil Code would ensure an overarching system that provides legal consequences for
contractual relationships. This would also lessen the burden on nation states that are currently incorporating the
growing number of EU directives in a piecemeal fashion pursuant to EU requirements. See Curran, supra note
238, at 115.
301. ACTION PLAN, supra note 233, at 16.
302. Id.
303. Id. at 21.
304. Id..at 16-17.
305. Id. at 18.
306. Kallweit, supra note 226, at 280.
307. Id.
308. Id.
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throughout Europe would ensure that terms are defined consistently, and once
3 9
t
used by all member states, it would reduce the need for foreign legal advice.
Furthermore, it is not enough that the legislation be codified uniformly; issues of
uniform application by judges may require implementing a different system of
adjudication in Europe"1 Procedure must be harmonized to accommodate
problems associated with different interpretations among national courts that may
hinder proper enforcement of contractual obligations among parties."'
VI. CONCLUSION

The precise ingredients necessary for a successful transition to a market
economy is still an elusive concept. Economic success is not guaranteed by
simply enacting new legislation.' 9 Attracting foreign investment is a central
element to fostering economic growth.313 Considering the results of the Doing
Business and Economic Freedom Index, evidence suggests that Estonia is indeed
headed in the right direction." 4
While there is certainly no exact reason for these high rankings, Estonia has
reformed core legislation underlying private law by enacting new legislation
governing contract formation and restructuring their judicial system. The
importance of reforming contract law, the judicial system, and the educational
methodology has facilitated Estonia's integration into Europe. By harmonizing
legal principles with those of other European nations, business transactions
between Estonia and other European entities will suffer from fewer
complications, as compared to other nations who have not implemented
reforms. 3 ' As transacting business will become less complicated, the result may
be an increase of international transactions that is required to boost the Estonian
economy. Nations that continue to suffer economically, despite reform efforts,
should follow the Estonian example of comparative study and legal harmonization to successfully integrate with the rest of Europe.
Estonia's focus on reforming legal rules governing private law is important
because it is those rules "whose initial function is to facilitate and to underpin the
choice made by people largely unaware of its existence. ' 6 Codified rules alone

309.
310.
311.
312.
10, at 91.
313.

ACTION PLAN, supra note 233, at 23.
Kallweit, supra note 226, at 294.
Id.
Russia is ranked seventy-nine and Kazakhstan is ranked eighty-six. See WORLD

315.
316.
(1994).

See supra Part Va.
Bernard Rudden, Civil Law, Civil Society and The Russian Constitution, L.Q.R. 110 (JAN) 56, 59

BANK,

supra note

Timothy Frye, Keeping Shop: The Value of the Rule of Law in Warsaw and Moscow, in ASSESSING
THE VALUE OF LAW IN TRANSITION ECONOMIES 229, 232 (Peter Murrell ed., University of Michigan 2001).
314. WORLD BANK, supra note 10, at 91.
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are not enough.3 7 A legal system must be viewed as a whole, and not simply as a
collection of individualized statutes that do not correspond to each other.3 ' To be
truly effective, legal standards need to be adopted into society as a legal norm
that is incorporated into everyday business practice.3 9
Freely-negotiated contracts are the building blocks behind every business
transaction in international commerce. 3 0 Without well-constructed laws
governing the formation of contracts,32 ' business transactions will suffer because
there will not be any common understanding from the beginning of each business
relationship.322 To effectively conduct business, a basic understanding of
elementary principles relating to business transactions is necessary. 323 If
contracting parties do not have a similar comprehension of basic business
transactions, there will be difficulties in interpretation324 and performance.323
Estonia reformed legislation governing contract formation because the
previous Soviet system was not sufficiently adaptable for business cooperation
with EU nations. 326 As commercial relations are becoming increasingly

317. Cynthia Clement & Peter Murrell, Assessing the Value of Law in Transition Economies: An
Introduction, in ASSESSING THE VALUE OF LAW IN TRANSITION ECONOMIES 1, 1l(Peter Murrell ed., University
of Michigan 2001) (stating that written law cannot explain litigation behavior of Russian enterprises).
318. See Kalvis Torgens & Amy Bushaw, Some Comparative Aspects of Contract Law and Common
Law Systems, 12 INT'L LEGAL PERSP. 37, 71 (2002) (discussing the difficulties of transposing written text from
one language to another).
319. See Orucu, supra note 265, at 221 (stating that internalization of norms and standards by the
recipient of a legal transplant system is crucial for development); see also Robert D. Cooter, The Theory of
Market Modernization of Law, 16 INT'L REV. L. & ECON. 141, 142-43 (1996) (explaining that if economic law
is poorly adapted to the economy, expectations, conflict, and cooperation are difficult and disputes consume
resources).
320. See Danielle Mazzini, Stable International Contracts in Emerging Markets: An Endangered
Species?, 15 B.U. INT'L L.J. 343, 344 (1997).
321. See Kathryn Hendley, Peter Murrell & Randi Ryterman, Law Works in Russia: The Role of Law in
Interenterprise Transactions, in ASSESSING THE VALUE OF LAW IN TRANSITION ECONOMIES 56, 87 (Peter
Murrell ed., University of Michigan 2001) (explaining that a clear and enforceable contract will reduce
transaction costs for both parties).
322. See Francis S.L. Wang & Laura W. Young, Prescriptionsfor Iraq, Predictionsfor Russia and
Performancefor China: China's Market Economy-A Historical Perspective, 18 TRANSNAT'L LAW. 11, 11
(2004) (describing economist Hernando De Soto's perspective that the key ingredient for a market economy is
trust); see also Norbert Horn, Uniformity and Diversity in the Law of InternationalCommercial Contracts, in 2
THE TRANSNATIONAL LAW OF INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL TRANSACTIONS (Norbert Horn, Cline M.
Schmitthoff & Richard M. Buxbaum eds., Kluwer Law and Taxation 1982) (stating that clarity, stability, and
uniformity in contracts are required for international commerce to function).
323. See Hannu Honka, Harmonization of Contract Law Through International Trade: A Nordic
Perspective, 11 TUL. EURO. Civ. LF 111, 117-18 (1996) (explaining how parties may be discouraged from
entering into intraregional trade because the law governing the transaction will be unfamiliar to at least one of
the parties, which therefore makes the outcome of litigation unpredictable).
324. See Kull, supra note 48, at 119 (stating that the goal of European integration is a common civil law
that would eliminate discrepancies between legal systems).
325. See Lopez-Rodriguez, supra note 194, at 1196 (stating that some scholars argue that the existence
of different contract laws may be regarded as a nontariff barrier to trade).
326. See Varul, supra note 9, at 104 n.1 (stating that economic principles, such as state planning
principles as the basis for Soviet civil law, conflicted with the market economy 'freedom of contract' as basis
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international, the need for basic understanding among contracting parties is
essential to furthering harmony among international business entities. 32' Even the
mere perception of legal environments can have an effect on economic growth.32 s
Furthermore, merely transposing another nation's laws into national legislation
can have drastic consequences if the laws are not adapted to take into account
other societal pressures.

329

Judicial reform was absolutely necessary in Estonia because to be effective,
laws need to be enforceable in a court of law. 33 0 Economic players usually make
very calculated decisions whether to resolve commercial disputes in courts of law
or whether to resort to alternative means to find solutions to business disputes. 33'
One problem in Soviet civil law was the inability of courts to effectively enforce
many of the laws already in force.332 Many judges emerging from decades under
Communist rule were not able to easily adapt to the impartiality that is required
to effectively adjudicate in a market economy structure.333 Furthermore, the

judicial systems of Eastern Europe were wrought with corruption, incompetence,
and budget deficiencies.334 Consequently, the introduction of new legislation also
required extending new legal perspectives to both the judiciary and lawyers
working within the system.333

for civil law); see also Glenn P. Hendrix, The Experience of Foreign Litigations in Russia's Commercial
Courts, in ASSESSING THE VALUE OF LAW IN TRANSITION ECONOMIES 94, 94 (Peter Murrell ed., University of
Michigan 2001) (stating that to attract foreign investment, Russia must provide mechanisms for a fair and just
resolution of disputes).
327. See Torgens & Bushaw, supra note 319, at 39-40; see also Friedrich Blase, A Uniform Law of
Contracts-Why and How? 8 COLUM. J. EUR. L. 487, 490 (2002) (suggesting that although the unification of
European contract law will not lead to an economic boom by itself, it will send a signal and may hold the key to
a truly unified Europe).
328. See Lee, supra note 4, at 134-35 (stating that the use of complete contracts and formal enforcement
methods is associated with a positive view of the legal environment, which is important in encouraging
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To remedy this problem, Estonia reformed the judicial system, which
336
included increasing the levels of transparency and making the judicial system
more accountable33 7 and less susceptible to corruption.33 s Additionally, reforms
were necessary to make the judicial branch independent and not easily influenced
by the executive branch.339
Achieving long-term success in transition economies also requires an
effective implementation of new rules into common legal practice. Education is
one of the most important factors for successful reform. 4' ° Attorneys from former
Soviet states were not accustomed to transacting business with the same level of
legal expertise as other parts of Europe. 34'
Reforms that began in the 1990s continue to improve the quality of Estonian
legal education.342 By employing new faculty, publishing more textbooks, and
incorporating EU law into the curriculum, Estonian law schools have enabled
newly-reformed laws to become realized in practice. 43 Furthermore, by
participating in programs to educate young lawyers with Western legal theory,
such as RIGA, the likelihood of success is greater. 34
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These reforms have ensured the success of Estonia in the EU. Even though
Estonia is a small country, its modem legal framework governing business
activity will promote business development and ensure the success of the new
market-oriented economic structure. Nations still in transition should look to
Estonia for guidance in how to effectively encourage beneficial legislative
reform.

